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The foimde:^s of the American republic were thoroughly
imbued with the principle of equal rights of all citi^'o-ir in matters
pertaining to the governerant, but because of the territorial extent
and population of the United States primary assemblages, where all
might meet and have direct vote and voice in deciding political
issues, were impossible. To overcoine this difficulty and still
preserve the original idea of equal rights a representative democ-
racy v/as formed* This, it v/as assumed, would permit each citizen
to have an authorized agent to represent him in the government, but
later there was considerable agitation because of the fact that
our so-called representative governments were at best but partially
representative. Various authors and public men pointed out that
frequently popularly elected officials were not even selected loy a
majoriti'- of the electorate but an actual minority*- and under the
prevailing mode of election there must alv/ays be a large number of
people who have no agent to protect their interests in political
affairs. Pages of election statistics were quoted to prove these
contentions and various schemes were proposed to remedy the defect,
all of which had the coranon purpose of giving the unrepresented
factions a voice in the government. The means to be used, however
varied w idely. Some of the plans proposed were quite simple and
had the fault of their virtue, that of crudeness. Others were
more elaborate involving mathematical complexities and assLuaing a
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2knowledge and comprehension on the part of the voter which he did
not cind does not possess. These schemes may, in a general way
without going into details, he summed up as the limited vote, the
cumulative vote, the "free list" and preferential voting.
While the active agitation for representative reform
"began about 1865 and spent most of its force in a decade, yet the
origin of the idea can be traced back to a much earlier date. As
far back as 1814^ Norway, in a constitution adopted that year, made
some provision for minority representation. In the discussion which
preceded the Parliamentary Reform Bill in England in 1832, the
question of minority representation was considered. Although the
proposed method, a limited vote, had some xmrm advocates it receivec
no general support and had no recognition in the law as finally
passed. In 1842 there was some apprehension in the United States
because of the single party delegations which some of the states,
where the general ticket plan of election prevailed, were sending
to Congress. This body considered the subject and passed an act
requiring Congressmen to be elected by the district plan thus
insuring both localities and parties better representation.
The year 1844 marks the beginning of a permanent litera-
ture on thesubject and a systematic, scientific research on the
part of social science writers. In that year appeared Thomas
Gilpin's v^ork entitled, "On the Representation of Minorities of
Electors to Act v/ith the Majority in Elected Assemblies." This
book seems to have received but little attention at the time and
became known only later ¥/hen the history of the movement v;as in-
it
vestigated and apparently had little effect in inciting the great

3interest in the subject which appeared a few years later. In 1854
Mr. James Garth Marshall published his "Majorities and Minorities;
Their Relative Rights", containing the first printed account of the
cumulative voting plan which later became popular both in Europe
and America.
One year later, due largely to the efforts of M. Andrae,
the Danish government adopted a plan of proportional representation
This was a cximbersome device, rather unique in some of its features
a.nd inapplicable to a populous country v/ith a large electorate.
In 1859, Thomas Hare published his noted volume, "The
Election of Representatives, Parliamentary a.nd Municipal" , in which
appeared his widely advertised s^z-stem that required endless de-
monstration to prove that it was applicable to modern electoral
conditions. In 1865 John Stuart Mill entered the lists as advocate
of proportional representation and with the entrance of this champi
popular interest in the scheme, v/hich vra,s to last about a decade,
was fairly well started.
The movement for representative reform was not accidental
but the logical result of certain conditions and popular theories
of
of the times. During the first half the 19th century the people
of the various states busied themselves v;ith liberalizing govern-
ments and attempting to distribute properly political power be-
tween the legislative, executive and judicial departments. By the
middle of the centurv in several of the more progressive countries
,
the liberalization and distribution had been accomplished to some
degree of satisfaction. The political reformers v/ere thus free to
turn their attention to some plan v/hereby the ls,rge number of

4factions, resulting from the wide extension of the voting privileg<
might receive "better representation.
In addition to the general idea of securing a more just
distribution of government power among the various political
factions there was a particular reason in England for endorsing
proportional representation. V/hen the working people were given
the electoral franchise in 1867, the proprietary and aristocratic
class, Vw'hich had been governing, feared that since they v/ere now
out-numbered at the polls, the goverment v/ould fall entirely into
the hands of the proletariaut and the erstv/hile ruling class would
be excluded unless some sort of proportional representation was
secured. A short experience hov;ever soon convinced the political
leaders that they had nothing to fear from the newly made voters
and the former soon lost what promised to be a keen interest in
the reform.
The movement in Europe however in some cases passed
beyond mere discussion and crystallized into lav;. In 1867 the
limited vote was adopted in English Parliamentary districts which
returned three members, the "three cornered," constituencies as
they were faiailiarly called. V/hen England was extending its free
school system, in order to placate the friends of priva.te and
secta.rian schools and secure to them a place on the school boards,
the cumulative voting method of election was adopted. Under this
law were held the noted school board elections of 1870. The number
of places to be filled was comparatively large and most of the voter^
manipulated their 10 or 15 votes to suit their individual tastes.
The inevitable result v/as confusion, injustice and inequalities, andl

5the exiieriment made no friends for ciunulative voting. After this
trial interest in the movement diminished and no more experiments
were tried.
Although one of the pioneer v/r iters on the subject of
Epresentative reform was an American, Thomas Gilpin, the people of
the United States were occupied witi:the exciting puhlic issues
preceding the Civil War and electoral refoms received no atten-
tion. When the vital question of the preservation of the Union had
"been settled and a "bitter parliamentary struggle v/as waging in
Congress the desirability of some change regarding representation
was evident. The occasion was, in some respects, remarkably aus-
picious for the considera.tion of a measure of this nature since
not only was the Congress then sitting representative of but one
section of the country but fresh in the minds of the people v/as
a great war hastened, if not brought on, by governjnent councils in
which the radicals of both sections controlled to the exclusion
of a larger body of conservatives. Supporters of the proposed
reforms v^ere not slow to take advanta.ge of the opjoortunity and to
spread the doctrines and writings of Mr, Hare and Jlr. Mill.
Certain sections of the South began to take an especially
active interest in the movement when the negro v/as enfra.nchised
for much the same reason a certain class in England had, namely,
the fear that the nev/ electors, having a numerical majority in some
sections, v/ould totally exclude the white population unless the
latter v;ere gra.nted representation in proportion to their numbers.
The fears of the Southeners however soon proved to be as groundless
as the English had found theirs to be.

6In 1867 Mr. Buckolew proi)Osed in the United States Senate
that the cumulative vote be applied in the elections in the recon-
structed states."^ Two years later Senator Buckalew offered another
bill in regard to cumulative voting in Congressional elections,
1 1
In 1870 and again in 1871 the subject was warmly debated in Cor-
grass, Jlr. Marshall of Illinois taking a prominent part in the dis-
cussion^ but Congress was not inclined to grant any concessions to
the Democratic minority.
Although the supporters of representative reform failed
in Congress they were more successful in some of the States. In
1867 New York used the limited vote to some extent in electing del-
egates to a constitutional convention. A clause providing for
minority representation a,nd cumulative voting for state legislators
was incorporated in the constitution of Illinois in 1870. In 1871
Mr. Buckalew succeeded in having the cumulative vote applied to
municipal elections in Pennsylvania, but two years later the statute
was repealed. In 1872 West Virginia adopted a constitution one
clause of v/hich a,uthoriz;ed the state legislature to submit to the
people some plan of proportional representation in the Senate
after 1876, The legislature hov/ever has never exercised the
authority conferred upon it by this section. In 1872 the New York
legislature, inspired by a desire to break the power of Tammany,
formulated a new charter for New York City v/hich provided for the
cumulative vote in the election of aldermen but the governor inter-
posed his veto. The legislature of North Carolina applied the
cumulative vote to elections in Wilmington but the law was la.ter
repealed. In 1874 Pennsylvania adopted a constitution applying
1.- Dutclier, "Minority Representation," p. 42 ,
1.
c
the limited vote to the election of police magistrates in the City
of Philadelphia and also to the election of judges of the supreme
court.
During the decade of its popularity proportional repre-
sentation experiments v;ere not limited to state elections hut the
idea was popular with organizations and societies of various
characters. The Board of Overseers of Harvard was elected on princi
pies of proportional representation in 1870. The advisability of
cumulative voting was seriously discussed in the General Convention
of the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1871 "but after consideration
was deemed inexpedient.
By constitutional provisions the cumulative vote has
"been applied to the election of directors in priva.te corporations
1
in eleven states; some of the constitutions containing these pro-
visions were adopted after the general interest in proportional
representation had subsided.
Although popular interest in electoral reforms waned rapid
ly after about 1875 the movement has never lost quite all of its
vitality. In 1884 Ohio, by legislative enactment, provided for
the election of police commissioners by the limited vote in certain
cities, but the state supreme court held this to be unconstitutional
Five years later the legislature of Michigan provided for election
of members of the lower house of the legislature by ciunulative
voting but the courts also held this to be contrary to the organic
3
law of the state. ' In 1891 South Dakota submitted for populs.r
1. - Illinois, Ne'bra-ska, California., Pennsylvania, W. Virginia,
Missouri, Mississippi, Idaho, Kentucky, North Dakota, Montana,
Common' s "Proportional Representation^*' p. 264.
2. - State V. Constantine, 42 Ohio 437,
3. - Maynard v. Board of Canvassers, 84 Michigan 228.
0.- Dutcher, "Minority Representation", p. 45.

8decision, a proposed constitutional amendment modeled on the Illinol.
plan of providinc for minority representation in the legislature
1
but the proposition was lost by a vote of 46,200 to 24,161. About
the same time several of the cantons in Switzerland modified their
electoral laws so as to provide for proportional representation.
In 1899 Belgium adopted a modification of the Swiss plan.
In the past fifteen years there has been no new develop-
ments in proportional representation in the United States. The sun
total of the application of the theory, in sone form or other, is
the cumulative voting in electing directors in private corporations
and in tv/o states, Pennsylvania and Illinois, judges and members of
the legislature are elected by methods intended to secure minority
representation. It appears remarkable that a scheme which contains
so much inherent justice and supported by such able men did not take
greater hold on the people and receive a much v/ider application.
One reason for the failure was that the class v/hich took a temporary
interest in the matter both in England and United States, because
they feared they would lose control of the government when the newlj
made voter realized his pov;er at the polls, lost that interest when
they discovered they were still able to maintain their supremacy
by the use of other and more effective means. Another and probably
the vital reason of the slow progress of the movement has been the
defects of the system itself as it has been'^applied. The methods
used v/ere in most cases crude and results have not been entirely/"
satisfactory. Another important practical difficult^'- has been that
the political faction passing a law of this nature gives large
power to an opposing minority and such self sacrifices are not commo
in partisan history.
1.- ComLion, "Proiortional Representation", p. 264.

9It is still an open question whether some plan can be
devised that will be effective and really secure proportional
representation and yet not be so complex as to be practically im-
possible in a country with a lR,rge voting population, V/Tiile the
unsatisfactory results of sone of the experiments have been un-
doubtedly largely due to the crude and undeveloped methods used
yet no one seems able to devise a scheme v/hich will be both simple
and effective. A plan which will secure exact proportional re-
presentation and still be practical in a country with universal
manhood suffrage is still the dream of the political idealist.
As mentioned in a preceding paragraph but two states,
Pennsylvania and Illinois, have constitutional provisions applying
to some extent the principles of proportional representation to
political elections. These tv/o states deserve further mention be-
cause it is here only that the experiment has extended over enough
time to really afford it an opportunity to work out legitimate re-
sults.
Pennsylvania in its constitution adopted 1873 applied the
limited vote principle to the election of its judicial officers*
There is a special provision for Philadelphia to the effect that in
the election of city magistrates "^o voter shall vote for more than
two-thirds of the number of persons to be elected when more than
1
one are to be chosen." No unusual provision is made for the elec-
tion of Common Pleas judges but in regard to judges of the Supreme
Court the constitution states that, ""Whenever two judges of the
Supreme Court are to be chosen for the same times of service each
1.- Article 5, Section 16,
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voter shall vote for one only and when there are three to be chosen
he shall vote for no more than tv/oj candidates highest in vote shal]|
be declared elected." V.'hile as a whole excellent judges have been
selected under this provision and the judiciary of the state has th^
respect of the people yet the limited vote seems to be regarded as
a useless complication which has nothing to justify its existence
and it will in all probability be dropped at the first opportunity.
the
In Illinois inadequacies of the existing constitution,
especially the legislative provisions, were constantly becoming more
apparent to political leaders, and in lvB62 an unsuccessful attempt
was made to remodel the organic law of the State. As soon as the
Civil War was over constitutional reform was again considered, and
the question of calling a convention was left to the people for
decision. Although there was practically no opposition the in-
difference was so great that the proposition carried by a very small|
majority. Delegates were duly elected and the convention met
December 13, 1869. The assembly was probably the ablest body that
ever met in the state, a large number of the members having had
extensive experience in public affairs. The first v/eek v/as consumed
in organi^^ing and in December 20th the Standing Corrmiittees were
announced. One of these was designated as the Committee of Electora|[I
and Representative Reform, Joseph Medill of Chicago being chairman.
It is significant of the importance in which representation reform
was held in the convention that this c ommittee included some of the
best known men in the assembly, and was one of the ablest appointed
The people at large", however, judging from the small number of peti-
tions sent into the Committee, took but little interest in the sub-
I
IT
ject. A few x^etitions proposing various plans or;)roportional re-
presentation were received hov/ever, and at least one remonstrance
against the adoption of a.ny such innovations was presented,
Pehruary 10th the Cormnittee made a report embodied in
five sections. The first provided for the ratio of senatorial
representation. The second provided that three times the nunher
required for a senatorial ratio should constitute a senatorial
district each of which should choose three senators. Similar pro-
visions were made for representatives and representative districts.
Sections three and four were "floater" clauses. These stated that
in case any district should have a fraction of population above the
ratio so large that "being multiplied hy the number of regular
sessions of the legislature in a decade the result should be equal
to one or more ratios that district should elect an extra repre-
tative or senator in those years in which the fraction so multipliei
would produce a whole ratio.
The fifth section stated that "In all elections of
Senators and Representatives each qualified voter shall be entitled
to as many votes as there are Senators or Representatives to be
elected by the same constituency/ and may distribute them (or equal
fractions thereof), equally or unequally among the candidates or
concentrate them upon one at his option; and the candidate highest
in votes shall be declared elected." '
^ .
On May 6th the commit tee^s recommendations were taken up
in the convention and the Chairman of the former then offered a
substitute for the previous report. This substitution is much
shorter than the original and consists of but three sections. The
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first provides that the apportionment for the Senate ahall be made
every t en years "bef^inning with 1871. The second section states
that the house of Representatives shall consist of three times the
number of the members of the Senate, And three representatives
shall be elected in each senatorial district.
Section three is the cimulative voting portion and is as
follov/s: "In all elections of representatives aforesaid each
qualified voter may cast as many votes for one candidate as there
are representatives to be elected, or ma:/- distribute the same, or
equal parts thereof, among the candidates as he may see fit; and
th6 candidate highest in votes shall be declared elected."
The report also recommended that these sections be sub-
mitted to the people as a distinct proposition, separate from the
main body of the constitution, foj: their rejection or approval.
It will be seen from the above that curmilative voting was
to be restricted to election of members of the lower House of the
legislature instead of applying to both as in the original report.
Also the "floater" idea was entirely abandoned.
The argument accompanying the report was a summary of
the theories of the times regarding minority'- representation. The
first part is devoted to a review of the general theory'- of the sub-
ject pointing out the injustice and inequalities of the usual
majority rule and showing how unrepresentative most deliberative
bodies really were. Then an argument for the particular system
recommended is presented. Obviously, it is asserted, single member
districts could give no opportunity for anything but majority rule
v/hile two-momber districts might easily afford the minority undue
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power. The smallest district therefore that would make minority re-
presentation possible was a three-member one. It was desirable to
have the districts as small as possible consistent with the ends
souglit so as to maJce legislators representative of localities and
also do as little violence as possible to existing customs.
The arguments which applied especially to local conditions
and the most effective one in the entire report,was that referring
to sectional representation. Itwas related that since 1854, with
fev/ exceptions, all the senators and representatives in the north
half of Illinois had been of one political party while the legis-
latore.^rom the other half of the state with equally fev/ exceptions
had been of the opposing party. In round numbers 100,000 Republi-
cans living south of the state capitol had been practically dis-
enfranchised and almost as many Democrats in the northern half had
suffered from the sane discrimination. Itvra,s pointed out that if
alternate districts were Republican or Democratic conditions would
not be so bad but such was distinctly not the case. An examination
of statistics showed alsD that in the last legislature a minority
had elected a majority in that body.
The freedom and power of the voter was also emphasized.
Under the ordinary election method when there is more than one
official to be chosen for an office, if a voter objects to any one
candidate, and refuses to vote for him, he simply loses a portion
of his privilege. Under the cumulative method, or "free ballot"
as it was called, he may transfer his entire vote to other candi-
dates and hence loses nothing. The argument concludes with a glow-
ing review of the benefits which will result fron the proposed
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reform. "The adoption of this great reform would do much towards
abating the baneful spirit of partisan animosity and removing the
temptations and opportunities which now exist for the corrupt use
of money at elections It will also tend powerfully to relieve
the voter from the despotism of party caucuses, and at the same tim(
constrain party leaders to exercise more care in selecting candi-
dates for law makers. There is nothing which will more effectually
put an end to packing conventions than arming the voter with the
three shooter or triple "ballot whereby he may fire "plumpers" for
the candidate of his choice and against those of his aversion. It
will increase the usefulness of the Legislature by improving the
membership. It will enable the virtuous citizens to elect the
ablest and purest men in their midst and secure to the legislative
1
councils a large measure of popular confidence and respect."
The convention after a short deliberation passed all
sections "by a large majority but as it was distinctly understood
that this was simply referring the question to the people the vote
is not significant of the sentiment of the convention. Neither
v/as there any debate on the subject which would indicate the opi-
nions of the members. At a popular election, the people by 99,022
affirmative, and 70,080 negative, votes adopted the scheme. The
advocates of the measure rejoiced that Illinois was thus the first
to inaugurate this democratic and beneficent reform and was to
stand the pioneer in a movement which they thought would strengthen
and purify our political system and which would eventually be
universally applied.; and across the Atlantic the great "London
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Times" in its issue of January 13, 1870, in discussing the subject
said, "And in Illinois, and what Illinois thinks today the Union
will think tomorrow, the discussion is passing from theory to
practical approval."
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THE EXTMT 0^ MINORITY KKPI^SIilNTATlpN SECimED
- BY TH^ CUIIULATIVJJ VOTE «
In the preceding chapter the conditions prevailing at the
time of the adoption of cumulative voting in Illinois and the
advantageous results which the supporters of the measure promised,
have "been descrihed. The next step is to consider the actual
effects of more than 35 years practical test of the plan and to
ascertain, as far as possible, to what extent the method has justi-
fied the expectations of its advocates.
A question that logically arises immediately is, does the
cumulative voting system alv/ays in each district give a minority
party representation? The answer to this question, with a few
rare exceptions which v/ill he noted later, can he given definitely
and decisively in the affirmative. In every senatorie.l district
in the state, with the few exceptions already mentioned, at least
tv/o parties and occasionally three have heen represented in the low-
er House of the legislature. The time-honored and usual rule is
for the majority party to have two representatives and the minority
one with occasionally a third party candidate defeating one of
either the tv^o principal party nominees.* AJLthough there have heen
hiennial elections in each of the 51 districts since 1872 under
the present constitution in "but three insta.nces have all three re-
1
presentatives heen the regular nominees of one party. In several
1.- These instances are*: district ^o, 38 in t!he' 36 tH" General" 'A'ssem-
bly (1888-1890) when the Democratic party had three representa-
tives. Districts Nos. 5 and 10 in the 40th Assembly (1896-98)
where there were three Republicans in hoth cases.
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other Instances the Republicans have had nominally three memhers
"but in these cases one or tv;o of the representatives ran on in-
dependent tickets as Independent Republicans, and were not regular
1
nominees of the party. This was especially true of the elections
in 1874 for the 29th Assembly whe'i in many districts the Democrats
nominated no candidates and helped elect the Independents,
system
As seen from the above figures the cumulative voting has
in practically all cases given a minority party representation but
this does not necessar^ily imply that it gives exact proportional
representation. The originators of the scheme did not asr^ert that
it would afford proportional representation to any degree of exact-
ness and contented themselves v;ith calling the plan minority re-
presentation. It is a mistake to suppose that the system is based
1.- The following table indicates districts and time of such occur-
rences :
1874 - 29th G'eneral Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
15, 1 regular and 2 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
20, 2 regular and 1 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
23, 2 regular and 1 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
28, 2 regvilar and 1 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District 29, 2 regular and 1 In-
dependent Republicans.
1874 - 29th General Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
30, 2 regular and 1 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District
dependent Republicans.
32, 1 regular and 2 In-
1874 - 29th General Assembly District 46, 1 regular and 2 In-
dependent Republicans.
1886 - 35th General Assembly District 16, 2 regular and 1 In-
dependent Republicans.
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primarily on the proportional idea yet so far as the tv/o
doninant parties are concerned it has lead to propor-t ional re-
presentation approaching mathematical exactness as indicated by
the table on the following page. Presidential years only have been
used as those years give a much better idea of the real party
strength since in the "off" years party lines are frequently
ignored because of local issues or fights and also because in those
years the interest in the few ste.te officers to be elected is not
sufficient to bring out the full vote and the figures are of but
little value as an indication of party strength.
It should also be pointed out that absolute conclusions
cannot be dravm from the above table for an;.- one year because of the
fact that but half of the Senate is renewed at 3.ny one election.
Hence there are at every session 50^ of "holdovers" in the Senate
who may or may not represent the present majority party in their
respective districts and this might operate to prevent the Senate
from being as representative as the House. As a whole the table
indicates how nearly each House has come to representing the pre-
vailing political opinion through a series of years. It will be
observed that, except in one instance of 1884 when the two parties
approached closely to proportional representation in both Houses,
the membership in the lower House comes much nearer indicating
the relative strength of the tv/o dominant parties than does the
Senate. The variation in the House in 1872 is due partially at
least to the fact that the voters v/ere not familiar v/ith the scheme
and the parties were not organized to meet the new conditions and
take adv8.ntage of them. The variation in 1904 is due largely to an
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TABLE I,
COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE VOTE AND KlilPKESJ^NTATION OP THE
CD
DEJTOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES
(I
•4^
(J ^
u
IN PRESIDENTIAL YEARS
I/)
It
o
o
Q J'
k
b
u
0^
I)
V.
(0
^ ^ a
1872
1876
1880
1884
1888
1892
1896
1900
1904
241,944
278,232
318,037
337,469
370,475
599,288
607,130
597,985
632,645
189 , 938
258,601
277,321
312,351
348,371
426,281
464,523
503,061
327,606
34
21
32
26
35
22
38
32
42
17
22
18
25
15
29
12
19
9
86
79
82
77
79
75
88
81
91
67
67
71
75
73
78
63
72
57
78
93
87
92
94
106
76
84
51
50
105
56
96
43
132
31
59
21
86
85
86
97
92
104
71
89
62
8
1
1
1
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abnormal Presidential vote and the proportion of memlDers in the
House
,
probably more nearly represents actual party strength than
does the Presidential vote. In all others years the percentage of
votes cast corresponds fairly closely to the percentage of members
of the party in the House, The Senate, however, shows a wide
variation. In 1888, 1896, and again in 1904, the minority party
had less than half the number it was entitled to as compared v;ith
the majority party v/hile all the years, 1884 excepted, show a large
discrepancy, the majority as is to be expected, always having more
members than its just proportion. It should be remembered in this
connection that Senators and Representatives are elected from the
same districts.
It is mathematically evident that a.ny party v/hich is able
to poll more than l/4 of the votes in a district may, by "plumping,
that is, casting all three votes for one man, elect a Repre-
sentative. The possibility of a comparatively small faction thus
being able to elect an official supposedly would operate for the
benefit of third parties but as a matter of fact these minor partiefe
have had but few representa.tives in the House. The total vote whicfi
they have cast in the state as a whole has been quite large, yet
it seldom happens that any minor party has more votes than the
weaker of the two large ones. Hov\^ever with the exceptions of 1872
1892, and 1900, third party men have been in every legislature,
there being five in House in 1904-06 and one or tv/o in' each of the
others as indicated in the above Table I,
.
Table I shows to what extent the cumulative vote affords
proportional representation when only the two dominant parties
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are considered. Table II gives the total legislative vote, the
vote "by parties and the actual and proportional representation of
each party in the legislature elected in 1906.
Opponents of the cumulative vote have called attention to
the large munher of votes cast in the state "by the minor parties
which elect few or no candidates. In the election of 1906, the
Prohibitionist, Socialist and Labor parties had 348,139 votes (not
voters) which was about Ibfo of the total vote yet all these conbi.nec^
elected but three members of the House. In Cook County alone the
1
same year 183,178 votes were cast without securing any representa-
tion. These statements simply verify what has already been mentione||d
that the cumulative voting plan does not claim to be primarily a
proportional representation scheme, but a minority party represen-
tation device and the tables and figures cited above indicate how
far the system gives a minority party representation and to v/hat
extent it gives, or fails to give, proportional representation to
all parties.
Y/hile it is true that minor parties receive no great con-
sideration this may not be really as great a practical defect as
it may appear. The principle of government by parties is firmly
fixed in American politics and the few third party members a-re not
talcen into the councils of either of the dominant parties a,nd ex-
cept in the unusual cases v/here they happen to hold the balance of
power they are given but little consideration and have but little
opportunity to exert anj^ influence. Moreover , with a large number of
parties and factions representee^ a legislative body almost inevitablj
1»- Cook 03unty fignjires frojai statement prepared by Legislative
Voters League, Chicago.
i
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TABLE ri^,
ILLINOIS LEGISLATUKlil, 1906.
Republican -
Vote for rep-
resentative,
1,154,258
per cent
of total
48
Represent
at ives,
elected
89
- Proper
tional
73
Democratic 870,347 36 61 55
Prohibition 161,275 7 3 11
Socialistic 99,633 4 6
Independent Labor 87,131 4 6
Independent and
Scattering 22,269 1 2
2,394,973 100 153 153
Vote for
Senator
Per cent
of total
Senators
Elected
Propor-
tional,
Republican 237,846 53 44 27
Democratic 142,567 32 7 16
Prohibition 11,998 3 2
Socialistic 25,965 6 3
Independent Labor 26,859 6 3
Independent 324
445,559 100 51 51
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degenerates into a mere debating society and accomplishes nothing.
This is well illustrated by the 29th Assembly, when in the Senate
there were 24 Republicans, 19 Democrats and 9 Independents, Liberal^
etc. In the House the Republicans had 69, the Democrats '42 and
1
41 Independents and others difficult to classify. The Assembly was
the sceneof disgraceful rows, personal combats and finally adjourned
v/ith but few results to show for its labors. Theoretically it may
be very proper and just for each faction to be represented in exact
proportion to its voting strength but experience scarcely bears out
the practical v/isdom of such a theory.
Since at legislative elections each voter is allowed
2
"to multiply himself three times" at the polls the 370,300 votes
cast in the state securing but three legislators represent approx-
imately 123,400 voters and the 183,000 ineffective votes in Cook
County about 61,000. In this connection it is only necessary to
point out that the same year in the state elections 370,333 votes
were cast for Superintendent of Public Instruction and 407,039 votes
for Treasurer, v/hich elected no official and were entirely lost.
In Cook County in the same year, 16 out of the 19 districts elected
Senators and 121,239 votes failed to secure representation. Had
elections been held in all districts and the ratio of ineffective
votes remained the saine for the thjree districts as in the other
sixteen there v/ould have been about 144,000 votes lost in the coun-
ty, as compared v;ith 61,0001ost in representative elections,
1, - Figures taken from Moses: "Illinois; Historical and Statistical"
p, 829, Figure's do not entirely harmonize with newspaper
accounts due probably to the difficulty of classifying some
members,
2, - This includes 22,269 scattering votes not included in the Pro-
hibition Socialistic and Labor vote previously given.
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Althouf;}! the cumulative vote does not secure any exact proportional
representation for all parties it has at least the virtue of
approaching it much more nea-rly than does the ordinary majority
system and there is far less loss of votes than usually prevails.
It is evident from a consideration of Tahle I«, page 19,
that where minority representation prevails, gerrymandering is
largely shorn of its viciousness. V/hen some minority party is
practically certain of securing at least one member out of three
in each district, such gross inequalities and injustice, that
frequently prevail as the result of the gerrymander must "be greatly
reduced. In Massachusetts in 1892 it required 16,560 Democrats
to elect one state Senator and only 6,182 Republicans to accom-
plish the same result. In other words one Republican equaled 2 2/3
Democrats. In 1894 Democratic members of the General Assembly of
New York received an average of 217,883 votes and the Republicans
6,341. In Michigan the same year, using the vote for Governor as
a basis, the Republicans with 237,215 votes elected 99 members of
the legislature v/hile the Democrats with 130,823 votes secured but
one. In Ohio in 1894 one Republican vote for legislator was equal
1
to 2 1/4 Democratic votes. In Illinois in 1906 it required 9,089
Republican, cind 35,889 Democratic, votes to elect a state senator,
while for the House v/ith the cumulative vote in the same year 12,
970 Republican and 14,268 Democratic votes elected a representative.
The apportiomuent of Illinois v/as made in 1901 when the Republicans
had a majority in both Houses and they were probably as keenly alive
1.- Pigures for Mass., IT. Y«
,
Michigan, Ohio, compiled from statis-
tics given in ComAon's "Proportional Representation." pp. 65-67 ,
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to party interests as any body of legislators and that they succeed-
ed in discriminating against the opposition is shown by the ine-
qualities in the senatorial vote. While the House vote shows some
variation and can scarcely be r-egarded as ideal, neverthelessi it has
none of those glaring inequalities which are so frequently found
as the result of the inherent injustice of the majority system com-
bined v/ith the consumation of political art in juggling district
boundary lines.
The constitution provides that "In all elections of
Representatives siforesaid each qualified voter may cast as many
votes for one candidate as there are Representatives to be elected
or may distribute the same in equa,l parts thereof, among the can-
didates as he shall see fit;" Leaving the voter really free,
without the restrictions of party discipline, to cast these three
votes as he sees fit might easily lead to an enormous loss of votes
by "plurai)ing" on one candidate thus giving hin far nore votes than
necessary to elect while a minority by judiciously distributing its
votes might elect tv/o candidates and secure excessive power.
It is frequently asserted by the opponents of the cumula-
some times
tive vote that by means of it minorities do secure undue represen-
tation, \Vhether this assertion is correct or not depends very
largely upon the view held regarding the rights of minorities. If,
as asserted by some violent partisans, the minority has few or no
rights that must be respected by the majority and that since the
majority party must assume responsibility for policies or legisla-
tion this party should have a free hand, then the cumulative vote
does give a minority party excessive representa-tion. If, hov/ever.
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the more sane -md just asniinption is made that a minority has certajjn
rights which a majority is ethically bound to respect and that the
minority is entitled to about the same ratio of representation in
governmental councils as it bears to the whole body politic , there i^
still so]iie question as to whether the minority does not secure more
representation than it justly deserves. The possibility of this maj
be illustrated mathematically by the follov/ing hypothetical case.
The majority in a district casts 18,000 votes and the minority
party 16,000, A and B are majority and C and D are minority can-
didates. A for some reason attracts more than his share of votes
and receives 11,000 leaving but 7,000 for B, The minority can-
didates run more evenly and each receive 8,000 votes. The result
is manifestly that a faction, while casting an actual rainorit^^ of
the total vote, has elected two out of three members. This is a
possible undesirable condition but one which actually occurs so
seldom that it does not constitute a very formidable objection.
Such inequalities are found occasionally but alwa^^s in
districts v/here the two parties are of nearly equal voting strength
In some cases the defect has been the result of "plumping" but
frequently such miscarriages occur in districts so close that a
fev; votes either way would change the result of the election.
On the follov/ing page, Table III, gives the districts in
•which such mishaps have occurred and the vote in ea,cii case.
It will be seen that there have been 24 cases in v/hich
the minority clearly had greater representation than it was entitlecj.
to have. In four, cases (JTos. 3, 15, 22, 23) this was caused by
the party managers being too conservative, or estimating incorrect-
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T _A B L E III .
tabtj: qy distkicts in which a minority painty
HAS ETJICTED A MAJORITY OP
REPRESMTATP/ES
Year Dist- .epu"blinan Vote Democratic Vo
t
r i 1
,
Total Total
1 18 (2 /d4 X 889 lO
3
'i. X 6 984 6 1 •<-# w xo
2 26 V ^ X 5, "^87 llj TOO1 78 X 6 377 5 314 li , oy 1
3 45 XI A ) <j ? 14], t)29 X 6 1 X ( u X 7j X y 13 , 329
4 1874 13
^
ftUO X 4,m "7u x «JOO-L 11, 303 X 4,, .Loo X 4 , uoo 8 , 226
5 25 V a.jL d
j
D 'Z Q
,
000 4, Q Q/y o4 11, 822 X 5], oU<i X 5 , xUx 10 ,403
6 1876 14 X 5 ,417 X 4, 338 9
,
ri CT CT755 4. 255 X 7 ,527 11
,
782
7 27 A o X 8» OD 16, 708 si, Uft 1 X 9] R A, CO 1^ ,513
8 1878 41 X 5j,516 X 4, 451 9, 967 X ,549 4j,433 9 ,982
9 1880 24 X 7j,349 X 7, 219 14, 553 X 7 ,443 7,,142 14 ,585
10 1882 9 X 3,,440 X 3, 228 6j 668 X 5j,236 3.>130 8 ,366
11 32 X 85,784 X 8» 725 17,,509 X 9,,325 si,194 17 , 519
12 1884 15 X 9,,953 6, 997 16, 950 X 7,,142 X 7 ,687 14.,489
13 1892 6 X25j,957 X 25 ,72e 51, 685 X61 ,637 61 ,637
14 1892 32 XI 1
5
,066 Xll, 090 22, 156 Xll, 420 10,,747 22 ,167
15 1894 9 X19j 980 19, 980 X 8,,744 X 9,,635 18 ,379
16 43 13
J
,329 X14, 020 27, 349 X13,,527 X13,,422 26 ,749
17 45 XI 1
J
,140 9, 628 20, 768 X 9,,793 X 9,,699 19 ,492
18 1896 40 15, 175 X15, 603 30, 778 XIS,,224 X15, 272 30 ,496
19 1898 6 X15, 091 X14, 992 30, 083 X15.,685 14, 909 30 ,594
20 49 XIO3 264 XIO, 080 20, 344 xioi 697 9, 685 20 ,382
21 1900 23 X15, 13 12, 226 27, 362 X12. 776 X13, 131 25 ,087
22 1904 17 X16, 265 16, 265 X 7,,483 X 6, 610 14 ,093
23 46 X28, 235 28, 235 X12.,682 X12, 429 25 ,111
24 1906 39 X 9, 931 X 9, 965 19, 896 9,,766 X13, 724 23,,490
X indicates the successful candidates in each case.
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ly the votinc strength, as the dominant party had but one candidate.
In six instances (Nos.l, 8, 9, 11, 14, 20) the vote was so very
close and such a small nurAer of votes and a yet smaller numher of
voters would have turned the scale that a party which thus lost
a representative could have but little grounds for a complaint of
injustice. In one instance {ITo, 4) the majority failed to elect
its quota because of having tliree candidates in the field. In the
remainingfourteen cases there is evidence of "plumping" to a
greater or less extent. This was sometimes caused by the compara-
tively great personal popularity of one candidate, sometimes be-
cause one v/as backed by an aggressive"machine" , but more frequently
v/here two or more counties are joined to maie up a district one
county has "knifed" a candidate and plumped for the "home" man .
thus getting local revenge at the expense of the party and fair
representation.
Table III covers a period of 18 elections in 51
districts and the minority thus secured a majority of represen-
tatives in about 2 l/2fo of the total number of elections. ViiTiether
due to "plumping" or other causes the propor-tion of mishaps is
small and the system has so seldom been subverted in such a manner
as to defeat the will of the majority that there can be no serious
accusation against the cumulative vote in this regard.
It has been asserted that because of the peculiar method
of electing representatives the party carrying the state elections
may fail to secure the majority in the legislature to which it is
entitled. The example cited is 1890 when the Democrats for the
first time in years secured the small number of state officers
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elected that fall. In the Senate the Republicans had 27 imd the
Democrats 24 members. In the House there v/ere 73 Republicans, 7 7
Democrats and 3 Parmer's Alliance members, the latter thus holding
the balance of pov/er on joint ballot. The above figures show that
so far as the House is concerned the Democrats did have a small
majority and the failure to secure a majority on joint ballot was
dvie t the non-^representat ive character of the Senate since of the
26 Senators v^rho held over 16 were Republican.
Partisans assert that a great harm may be done the majori-
ty bya minority/ securing undue representation at certain critical
times. This is most apparent when a United States Senator is to
be elected and the classical example given is the senatorial elec-
tion of 1877. In the elections of 1876 the Republicans cast for
President 278,232 votes and the Democrats 258,601. In the legis-
lature which assembled in 1877 as the result of the fall elections ,
there were in the Senate 21 Republicans, 22 Democrats and 8 Inde-
pendents. In the House the Republicans counted 79, the Democrats
67 and 7 Independents, thus again giving a small faction the
balance of power on joint ballot. The Independents clung obstinate-
ly to their senatorial candidate (Judge Davis) and finally the
Democratic vote was transferred to him thus giving the required
majority and the Republica,ns failed to secure an office they claimed
v/as justly theirs. V.Tiile such an occurrence is unfortunate, it is
simply an illustration of the occasional immense pov/er of a small
faction holding the balance of power and may and does happen occa-
sionally under any- system of election and is not a defect peculiar
to the cumulative vote.
1.1
I.
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Another objection to ninority representation is that in
case of the death or resignation of a House menber the majority
party would elect the new member of that district regardler^s of
the politics of the ex-member. In exceptional cases like election
of United States Senator, when the vote is close and party lines
tightly drawn, this miglit give a party a majority to whicli it is no1
justly entitled and which might be of considerable importance. In
many legislatures in Illinois vacancies have been caused b^^ death
or resignation yet no great injustice has ever been worked in
filling these and the likelihood of suc2i events causing party
1
disaster is so remote as to be scarcely worthy of consideration.
1.- "What has actually happened has been exactly the reverse of the
above. In 1885 at the death of a member of the House^ Senator
Logan by consumate political skill secured the election of a
Republican member from a strongly Democratic district, and v/as,
as a result, elected to succeed himself as United States
Senator.
I
i
.1
EFFECT ON PARTY ORGMIZATIOH .
The investigation of the results of cumulative voting
is difficult since with the exception of the bare, naked, facts to
be gotten from official statistics there is little information to "be
found on the subject. The history of the scheme is contemporaneous
history and it is not easy to determine what has been accomplished
by a movement still in progress. Many of the facts must be sought
from individuals still in active life and in order to supplement
statistical information a list of questions was sent to members of
the present legislature, state officials, editors of some of the
more important newspapers of the state, individuals who are active
in civic reforms and a few other prominent citizens* The tabula-
tion of the ansv/ers obtained will appear in this and following
sections*
In a preceding section appears the following quotation
from the report of the Committee on Electoral Reform to the con-
stitutional convention:
"It (minority representation) will also tend powerfully to
relieve the voter from the despotism of part^'- caucuses and at the
same time constrain party leaders to exercise more care in select-
ing candidates for law making. There is nothing which will more
effectually put an end to the practice of packing conventions than
arming the voter v/ith the three shooter or triple ballot power
whereby he may fire 'plumpers* for the candidate of his choice and
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against those of his aversion." In other words the cmnulative vote
would deal a death blow t o party bossism. In a recent report
issued by the Legislative Voters League of Chicago appears the
statement: "By it (minority representation) the people of Illinois
have lost control of their Legislature," and "Minority Representa-
tion has been one of the most vicious acts ever placed upon the
statute books*" "The candidates nominated and elected under the
present system are in most instances merely errand boj'-s and mes-
1
sengers for the party boss," It would be difficult for the asser-
tions to vary more widely. One is the statement made by a civic
reformer prophesying the results of one of his favorite projects,
the other was made after that scheme had been tried for 35 years*
\Vhile the first, being but a prophecy, can prove nothing^ neither
do the latter empiric, dogmatic statements convince.
One of the questions submitted to those who were inter-
vie7/ed on the subject was, "Does the system (cumulative vote)"
increase or diminish the pov^er of the party machine?" Eighty four
definite answers were received to this question. Nine of the number
asserted that the power was diminished, 35 maintained that the
system had no effect on party organization v/hile 40 asserted, and
most of these were very certain as to the correctness of the answer,
that the influence of the party machine was greatly increased. It
1.- It is rather curious to .note that in reports of this same or-
ganization appear the following: "The things v/hich have dis-
tinguished this Legislature are the high character of a majority
-< of its members,..." "\Ie are prepared to state that it is an
absolute fact that a large majority of the members of the 44th
General Assembly are honest and patriotic citizens" and various
kindred statements.
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is Interesting if not important, to note that of the nine who
thought party power was diminished, seven are merahers of the
present legislature and in general there is considerahle variation
between 'the answers of politicians and others v/ho are but observers
or critics of political affairs.
One strong evidence of strict party control is the limitec
number of real candidates v/hich appear on the ticket, especially in
the Chicago districts. It is true that there are frequently seven
or eight candidates for the three places each election, but usually
there are but three nominees of the tv/o dominant parties combined
and nomination thus becomes practically equivalent to an election.
•Other candidates represent various minor parties and are fully
aware that ordinarily they have no cliance of election. The usual
rule is for the majority party to nominate tv/o, the principal
minority party one, and this custom is practically/ universal so far
as the former party'' is ^concerned, Prioa^ to 1896 three candidates,
of one party did appear occasionally but these were found only in
districts where the majority party v/as unusually strong and had som€
hopes of electing thre^ members or what was more usual the three
candidates were the result of county/- fights where two or more
counties are combined in one district. In such cases it sometimes
happened that the larger county demanded and secured both regular
nominees and the smaller county/- for the sake of revenge v/ould adopt
the suicidal policy of putting a candidate of its own in the field.
So far as vie are aware no majority party has ever nominated three
candidates in order to give its constituents a greater choice at
the polls.
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The niunber of candidates to be nominated, ordinarily no
more than can be elected, is determined by the party leaders and
the nominations have been made in caucuses and conventions which
are the creations of the party and where the party cliques and pro-
fessional politician usually has complete control* Under such con-
ditions and considering the shrewdness with which party leaders have
always taken advantage of every opportunity to build up a compact
organization, can there be any doubt but that the "machine" v/ill
have a firm grip on legislative elections?
In Cook County which has 19 districts and consequently
57 Representatives to elect there have been but from 59 to 61
candidates presented by the combined Republican and Democratic
parties. The rule of having but three candidates presented by the
two political parties is almost universally adhered to in this
1
County though in at least one district both in 1904 and 1906 the
majority'- party was strong enough to elect all three Representatives
but presented but two candidates. This failure of a partj'- to
grasp an office evidently within its reach is strongly indicative
of a "gentlemen's agreement" between the leaders of the two parties
regarding the division of spoils.
In the districts outside of Cook County the appearance
of four candidates of the two great parties is not so unusual
but the custom of having four or more nominees is by no means
universal. In these 32 districts in 1906, in 10 the two dominant
parties nominated four candidates for the three positions. In
1904 in the same districts four candidates appear in but eight of
1.- Seventh District.
II
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then; in 1902 in but seven. In 1900, under the apport ionnent of
1893 in which there were 36 districts outside of Cook County, 20
districts had four or more candidates of the two main parties in
the field; in 1898, 26 districts and in 1896, 20 districts; in
1894, 29 districts.
It appears from the ahove figures that the elections of
the minority party in certain districts have some choice of can-
didates when they go to the polls. It will also he seen that there
is no uniform rule governing the minority in regard to nominating
two candidates hut there is a very evident and material decrease in
the number of four*candidate districts in the three elections
since 1900. V/hether this is merely accidental or. whether it is a
permanent tendency can not be definitely determined at present.
Y^Tienever there are two candidates on the same ticket and but one
can be elected there is obviously an excellent prospect for an
intre.-party fight. The country districts are tiring of taking
chances of wrecking the party by internal strife v/ith no prospect
of gaining any greater representation than if the party leaders tooi
the matter in hand and nominated no more than could probably be
elected. Because of these conditions the tendency/ apparent since
1900 to reduce the niomber of candidates v/ill probably continue.
A study of election statistics reveals little or nothing
regarding party discipline. In some districts where there are four
candidates a-nd naturally each nominee of the minority party will
induce as much "plumping" for himself as possible the equality of
the vote would seem to indicate a slavish obedience to the party
exhortation not to "plump" but to vote 1 l/2 votes for each candi-

date. In other cages "plumpinG" does appear "but it is impossilile
due
to tell whether this is to a voters' rebellion against party
domination or v/hether it is an indication of the power of the party
bosses as it might be the r esult of the latter using their influenc(
to elect a weak candidate.
Such a scheme as minority representation and cumulative
voting must aiutomatically increase party control. Several thousand
voters coming to the polls each with three votes to distribute as
he sees fit v/ithout a certain amount of party sT^)ervision can lead
to nothing butconfusion, injustice, and misrepresentation. Some
popular candidate might receive a large share of the votes while
tvTo others, a majority of those to be elected in this case, might
be selected loy a. few thousand votes each. There would inevitably
be such a loss of votes and unfair representation that the people
would demand, or at least acquiese in, party managers* dictation
in order to prevent such useless and indiscriminate voting.
The undesirable conditions described above are not a mere
supposition of v/hat might happen but specific instances can be
cited of the disaster attending ciimulative voting elections without
party organization among the mass of the people. The best illustra-
tions are the notorious English School board elections in 1870
already mentioned, v;hen in some of the districts as many as 15 mem-
bers vi/ere to be elected and each elector as in Illinois had as many
votes as there v/ere places to be filled. In Manchester there were
15 members to be elected. "Manchester is famous for tv/o things--
first the fervor of its Protestantism; second, the number, organiza-
tion and strength of its v/orking classes. But at this election two
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Roman Catliolics were broucht in at the head of the poll, one of then
receiving nearly 20,000 more votes than any Protestant candidate
and no working class candidate, of whom there v^ere seven,heing
1
elected at all." In ICarylebone, a district of London, the favoritd
candidate received 47,858 votes and the next in the list had only
13,494. In Finsbury another district of London the highest number
received by one candidate was 27,858 and the next highest but 10,
766. In Birmingham the 15 successful candidates v/ere voted for by
2
about 18,800 voters v/hile 10,100 lost their votes on unsuccessful
candidates—a much greater percentage of non-representation than
usually prevails in the single vote method. If specific instances
are necessary to prove what appea.rs a.n almost axiomatic truth--the
futility of a. t tempting an election v/ith the cumulative vote without
party organizatien and leaders able to control that organisation,
the English school board elections furnish plenty of instructive
examples.
While there can be no doubt but that a scheme of cumula-
tive voting because of inherent peculiarities will crea.te a demand
fora strong party organiEation this does not necessarily condemn
the system nor does it necessarily imply that the members of the
various legislatures of the state have been "machine" men in the
o|jprobrious sense in which that term has come to be used. However,
legislative conditions in the state have not been altogether satis-
factory, to put in mildlj/, and the records of some of 'the legisla-
tures havenot been ideal. Granting for the sake of argument that
all the many accusations made against the legislature in the past
1. - Quoted in Dutcher, "Minority Representation." p. 72
2. - Figures ta-ken from Dr-tcher, pp. 69-74
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few years are true, it would appear that the cumulative voting
system has "been more sinned against than sinning. Admitting all
the charges there is no evidence anyv/here nor any analogy from whic
conclusions can he drawn which v/ould warrant any "belief other than
that the "machine" vrould he just as corrupt and have just^as com-
plete control as it now has if the cumulative vote had never been
used. An investigation of the legislatures of New York, Pennsylvanja
Ohio, Kansas, Oregon, in fact almost any state selected at random
will shov/ that other states suffer from exactly the same political
"hoss" evils of which Illinois complains. The sins of the latter
state's legislature seem to "be those of omission rather than com-
mission. There have "been vexatious delays in securing legislation
made necessary by the rapid advance of the state "but there have
been few or no charges of positive corruption such as are not in-
frequent in other s-tates.
The same organization which calls the cimiulative voting
system the "most vicious piece of legislation ever placed on the
statute books" also says: "These tv/o measures illustrate how the
organizations of the Senate and House v/ork hand in hand. They
divide the responsibility--cne kills one bill and the other another.
In other v/ords the Senate is a.s bad as the House and yet the Senate
has never been tainted v;ith the cumulative vote. Also in this
state there was no cumulative voting prior to 1872, ajid surely
the records of some of these earlier legislatures are nothing to
boast of. So grea.tly did the early law making bodies abuse their
power that one of the principal reasons for calling the constitutionjl-
1,- Legislative voters League," Preliminary Report on the 45th
G-eneral Assembly." 1908,

al convention in 1848 and again in 1864 v/as to limit legislative
discretion. It is not necessary here to describe the "internal
improvement" policy, the oppressive state debt, attempts at re-
pudiation, the passage of questionable private bills and the long,
dreary list of legislative short coinings but it is doubtful if the
later legislatures can equal the unenviable records of many of their
early predecessors.
As might be expected the v/orst complaint comes from Chi-
cago and it is here that the cumulative vote has been worst
abused. This is only one of numerous examples of the inability of
municiiialities to successfully govern themselves. Under present
conditions any system, no matter hovi ideal,would probably go amiss
in Chicago though on the v/hole it has been better governed than
most ofthe large cities. If there are at present in Chicago but
59-61 real candidates to fill 57 positions, under the one-member
distinct and single vote the city would probably be so gerrymandered,
Vi^ith ward lines for district boundaries, that there would be no
more real candidates than at present. The agitation in Chica,go
against the cumulative vote is only another indication of the ten-
dency of the cities to persistently blame their misgovernment on
the system of constitution in vogue and demand a change there rather
than place it on the electorate vmere it belongs. In other words,
an attempt to dodge the r-eal issues by trying to reform the consti-
tution instead of public sentiment.
The above is v/ritten v/ith no intention of either defending
or condemning the state legislatures but rather to clear the
cumulative voting system of certain charges which it is not al-
together guilty. It v;ould be useless to deny that the cumulative
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vote requires strict party discipline and that in this system the
political "boss" found ready made a means of exercising his control
hut all evidence tends to show that if such means had not heen
furnished he would have found methods of his own to accomplish the
same purpose. It is, of course, a very negative sort of a re-
commendation to say that a system is no worse than others hut so
far as the evils of excessive party control is concerned that is
the most that can he said for the cumulative vote as actually appliei
in this state. But it should be borne in mind that these evils
are not all due to cumulative voting per se but rather to abuses
of the s^'-stem and here is really the heart of the v/hole question.
As the scheme has vrorked out in practice legislative nominations
have become practically equiva,lent to election and the evil is of
course that these nominations are largely controlled bi'- a limited
number of party leaders. If it can be freed of its abuses and al-
lov/ed to work out its legitimate results, minority representation
in Illinois hasmuch to recommend it. But if these abuses can not
be prevented it is difficult to see how the party *s grip on legis-
lative selections can be loosened. The possible remedies for these
practical evils v/ill be considered in a later section.
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PRACTICAL DirFIClIT.TIES OP TIffi CUMULATIVE VOTE
AND ITS EEIECT ON TIffi P^JiSONNEL
OE Tim LEGISLATUEE «
V/hen the advocates of electoral reform were bu^ formulat-
ing schemes of minority representation they had no difficulties in
devising theories that would afford such represent ation v/ith mathe-
matical exactness. The real difficulty lay in making these methods
simple enough that the ordinary voter and returning "boards could
vote and tabulate results intelligently and accurately. The ^- re-
mittee on Electoral Reform in the constitutional convention also
struggled v/ith this problem and abandoned their first device as too
complicated. The plan finally recommended v/as the simplest the
committee could devise but even then it was feared there v/ould be
»
trouble in voting and counting votes. As a matter of fact, as
happens whenever a.ny new system of voting is put into operation,
there v/as some difficulty at the polls but this grew less as the
voters became more familiar with the plan. Later v/hen the
Australia,n ballot v/as introduced there v/ere more difficulties for
atime. To obtain further information on this subject the follov/ing
question v/as. included in thelist sent out over the state: "Are
there any practical difficulties in the operation of the system
such as difficulties in voting, counting votes, etc?" Of the 93
annv/ers received to this question, 60 asserted that there were no
difficulties at all, or if any, they were so slight as to be of no
real imt)ortance. 33 answered that the difficulties were serious
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enough to constitute a real olDjection. In the great majority of
cases these latter were op]>osed to the entire plan and v/ere incline(,
to attack every phase of it v/hether there v/as really justification
for such attack or not. V/hatever difficulty there may have been
was due la,rgely to the statutes on the subject as the laws were
vague and indefinite but this defect was remedied by an act of 1905,
Having half votes to count and record mezr require a little more
time to arrive at results than under the ordinary system of voting
but beyond this inconvenience the practical difficulties are so
slight that they can not be considered as any real objection.
V/ith the idea of ascertaining public sentiment on the
question and to ascertain if minority representation in its some-
what crude and limited form v/as regarded sufficiently successful
that the people of the&tate would approve of a wider application
of the same principle a question was included in the previously
s
mentioned list asking ?;hat advanta.ge, if any, v/ould be gained by
increasing the size of the districts and electing more than tliree
men from each. Evidently the le-rger the districts and the more
officials elected from each the more opportunity small factions
would have of being represented and the more nea.rly the scheme
would approach proportional representa.tion. Of 88 v/ho replied
directly to this question 3 favored the idea of larger districts
and 85 disapproved, but it is evident that the ansv/ers are of but
little value so far as an expression of opinion regarding propor-
tional representation is concerned. Apparently none of those
replying considered the wide extension of the principles of pro-
portional representa.tion v/hich such a change v;ould cause and opposed
1.- Revised Statutes, 1906: Ch. 46. Section 54.
J(
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any such increase in the size of the districts on grounds of cenera]|
inexpediency. The answers are, hov/ever, very significant in in-
dicating how completely the idea of proportional representation has
sunk into desuetude and hov/ completely it has been eliminated from
the list of live political questions.
In investigating minority representation in Illinois
an attempt was made to ascertain v/hat effect, if any, the scheme
had on the personnel of the legislature. This is obviously a
rather delicate subject and an exceedingly difficult one to in-
vestigate. The people of the state are familiar with the various
legislators, past and present, and have, in a general way, a
knowledge of their ability but the quality of men who might have
been in the legislature under some other form of election is an
entirely unknown and indeterminate factor. In the list of ques-
tions sent out the following Y/as included: "Are the candidates
nom.inated and elected under the present sj'-stem of better character
or of more ability than v/ould probably be secured under the ordi-
nary one-member district?" Of the 84 who replied to this ques-
tion directly, 6 ansv^ered unequivocally in the affirmative, 21 asser
ed exactly the opposite and most of these v;ere quite positive in
their answers. 33 made the cautious answer that at least the
members usually secured were no better than v/ould be elected by
other methods v;hile 24 were of the opinion that the method of elec-
tion had no effect on character or ability of members.
Since the question propounded can not be answered
definitely and at best is largely one of opinion ideas of the citi-
zens of the state on the subject may be interesting. The conclu-
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sions of those intervi^nved are tased on o):aervation and
experience
and the standincin the comnunity of those quoted are in all
cases
.9
such as to entitle their opinion^ to consideration.
A raeralDer o'f the present legislature says: "I would say
in general theyare prohably more representative rien."
Another mernlDer of the General Assemhly: "The worst
candidate stands the best chance of election as appreciating the
fact that he is weaJc the "plumping" is often times overdone to even
up the vote,"
c
An editor ansv/ers the question succintly and positively:
"Most assuredly not,"
A well known lawyer from Chicago asserts: "I believe
that the one member district plan would be infinitely preferable ir
its results both as to character and ability of the representatives
secured. This because it would require an actual fight before the
people for election."
Another editor rem.arks : "Undoubtedly no. In propo-rtion
as responsibility is divided men of less character are chosen for
public service."
A prominent official: "No. I believe the present systej|n
secures poorer resultsin both character and ability than a flat
one vote process. I tJiink the cumulative three vote plan enables
an inferior candidate to be elected in many instances."
A Chicago citizen says: "I think the reverse is true as
the men selected are willing to hold their offices as the henchjiier
of the political leaders and are apt to be less independent than
the men who v/ould be selected in the ordinary one-member district
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A Conf^ressnan expresses himself as follows: "I do not
think the present system can have any relation to the character and
ability of the candidates. Neither better nor v/orse candidates are
selected on account of it."
Another writer says: "Do not think tlie method of elec-
tion would have anything to do with it. The office not the nan
attracts the candidate."
Members of the present legislature: "It would probably b(
the same fellows." "The source and character of the constituency
govern these things."
Another citizen is eloquent by what he omits: "This is
very hard to answer. V^e elect our aldermen each election one from
a ward and "
Others say: "I do not think the system, affects the matte:'
of ability, Illinois mem.bers compa.re quite favorably with members
from other states." "This is a doubtful question and perhaps the
time v/ill never come under any circumstances or system, that may
be adox^ted when the best men will represent the people in the le-
gislature of any state," "No difference as to character or
ability. Only gives a more diversified representation."
As quoted in a. preceding section the Electoral Committee
contended that: "It (cumulative voting) will increase the useful-
ness of the legislature by improving the membership. It v/ill enabl(
virtuous citizens to elect the ablest and purest men in their midst
and secure to the legislative councils a large measure of popular
confidence and respect." Hov/ far this contention has been justifies
in popular opinion is indicated by the tabulation given above--but
6 out of 84 maintaining that any improvement in the personnel of th
j
legislature has occurred.
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It should be noted in this connection that many of those
who maintain that the personnel of the General Assembly has deter-
iorated because of the ciunulative vote ascribe the blajne to the
pernicious system of nominating rather than to the method itself.
The individuals expressing opinions are not altogether fair in
their comparisons betv/een the cumulative vote and the ordinary
method. They are fullyaware of the defects of the method used and
compare a system and its practical evils with an ideal conception
of the one vote method forgetting that the latter has equally
bad, if not the same, evils when put into operation:^ Also it is
the fashion to deciy and ridicule all legislative bodies from
municipal councils up the Congress of the United States. Creative
legislation is a difficult task and v/hen mistakes are made there
are 2^1ent3r to exercise the right to become a self-constituted criti;
and denounce both statutes and their authors and an allowance must
be made for this prevailing custom.
There are tv;o features, aside from the increased power
of the parti'- machine, which ma3'- aid in the election of inferior
candidates. It was expected that the voter's privilege of "plump-
ing" would tend to defeat undesirable men but in fact this has
at times v;orked out in exactly the opposite v/ay. Practice here
illustrates hov/ easily a reform may be utili?^ed advantageously by
the very people against v/hom the measure was aimed and the "triple-
armed voter--the terror of party despotism" seems to have been
reduced to a very harmless terror indeed. As already mentioned th€
party ring may exert all its influence to elect its candidate while
an honest nominee may unwittingly aid his ov/n defeat by asking his
i
party to divide t:ie vote equally between himself and his ticket- i
mate. While such cases may happen their frequency has undoubtedly |
been exaggerated. Election statistics show but comparatively few
instances where a candidate has been defeated by"pluiiipins? Even
assuriini-, what facts will not warrant, that all nominees who fail oi;
election are the very ones that should have been elected fev/ men
on this account
have been kept out of the legislature who for the good of the com-
munity should have been there
Another circumstance which may affect the personnel of
the legislature is incidental rather than essential to minority
representation. In this state, if three legislators are to be
elected from a district, the number of these latter must be some-
what limited and this necessitates the union of two or more countlej
.
This combination leads to jealousies between the counties each
fearing that it will not get its share of the spoils. VtTien fights
of this sort start the personality and qualifications of the can-
didates are lost sight of and the only question considered b^'- the
voter is whether or not the nominee is a "home" man* "While these
county feuds exist and are sometimes of long standing it is doubt-
ful if they produce much effect on the personnel of the legislature*
Some desirable . candidates have probably been defeated because of
county jealousies but it is probably true that just as many unde-
sirable nominees have failed of election for the same -reason and
the account is about b^alanced.
Many of those expressing their opinion on the subject
assert that the method of election has nothing to do with the
character and ability of the legislators and this seems the reasona-
ble and. logical view. The voters and character of the voters v/ill
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be the same regardless of the method of election and generally I
speaking elected officials are representative of those froia whom
|
they receive their credentials. This, of course, assumes that the |
people really do select their legislators hut with the present
system of nominating party organi^.at ion v/ields an immense in-
fluence and leaves but little choice to the electorate at large.
V/hile thecuraulative vote requires strict party discipline
the abuse of that discipline is not essential but it is evident
that when the innovation was introduced into Illinois it was not
properly safe-guarded. The people of the state have watched the
subversion of their election system and v;hile little has been done
t) abolish it by a constitutional amendment several schemes have
been proposed to free it of its attendant practical evils. One
reform which has been suggested and championed by at least one
rather prominent civic organiz.ation is to compel each party to
nominate a full ticket of three candidates. The object i&jOf
course, to present a considerable number of men from which the voter
may select those he considers best qualified but the attempt to in-
augurate this change without specific statutory authority failed.
This method would obviously result in the abolition of minority
representation and would be a plain violation of the spirit if not
the letter of the constitution if such a law or custom was followed
in good faith. Por illustration we will assume a district in which
the Republican part^/ has a majority. This partj'- would nominate a
full ticket and the Democratic and other minority parties must
do likewise. Since part^*- disaffection is the unusual and revolu-
tionary rather than the usual condition the result would be ordinari
•
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ly t}iat each voter would deposit one vote for each candidate of hie
and
party, all three Republican nominees would be elected and minority
representation practically abolished. Such practice would give the
independent voters a chance to exercise their discretion but the
lot of the latter is not a pleasant one and it is only when the
occasional wave of civic virtue sweeps over the country that they
become numerous enough to endanger party success. The usual re-
sults of each party having a ticket of three candidates v/ould be
that the majority party v/ould elect all three representatives at
the expense of the minority.
If three men were nominated in good faith by each party
thus putting a larger number of candidates in the field of which
only three could be elected, the result would be a hard, bitter
fight not between parties but between nominees on the same ticket.
It would be easier for a RepubliGan>for example, to secure one
or one and one half votes from his colleague than it would to
cross party lines and secure the same from his Democratic opponent.
Parties would be torn to tatters, cliques and rings would grow
up around certain individuals and campaigns would be waged not
on political issues but personalities. Such a change would in no
way affect the real evil in the case and would only make a bad
affair worse.
In the above it is assumed that in nominating three
candidates each party acts in good faith. Ever3^ conclusion,
however, that can be drawn from past history or present conditions
indicates that such practice v/ould not be conscientiously carried
out by any partj'' nor is it probable that an^'- legislation could
1t
===j]
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accomplish the desired result. Taking the exairii.le previously given
if the Democrats only had enough votes to elect one man if they
"plumped" on him they undoubtedly v/ould "plump." Three names might
j
appear on the ticket hut it would he made known that two of them
were there to meet technical requirements and that there was but
one real candidate. A rebellious voter might not vote for that one
but if he did not he would be practically sure that he was throwing
away his vote.
The basic evil has been the method of nomination. So lon^
as nominations axe made in caucauses or conventions and the number
of candida.tes rigorously restricted to the nujiber that could be
elected, so long will the cumulative vote be abused and made the
effective tool of the party ring. A reform proposed to remedy
this defect is a direct primary law which, it is hoped, will
deal a death blow to machine domination. The strength of party
organization is well illustrated by the history of this movement.
Practically all of those interviewed on the subject, including a
considerable number of members of the present legislature, were
in favor of such a statute and none expressed themselves as opposed
yet there was a long hard fight before an act of this nature was
passed. By persistent efforts the friends of the measure succeeded
in having several so-called primary laws passed. These were un-
satisfactory, compromise m.easures, some of'v/hich failed to sta.nd
the tests of the courts and there were few regrets when they were
repealed or nullified.
The agitation v/as continued and aided by a constantly
increasing popular demand a much better lav/ has recently
I
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been secured. The part applying to legislative elections provides
for a senatorial coiiunittee consisting of one member from each count;r
in districts of more than three counties; otherwise three members,
all to be chosen by popular election. Any citizen legally qualif iei|
to fill the office may become a candidate for representative at the
primary and have his name printed on the official ballot by filing
a petition signed by 1/2 of 1^ of the primary electors of his party
in the district. Because of the easy fullfilment of the require-
ments there should be no dearth of candidates. Political managers
however did not entirely release their grip on legislative elec-
tions^s the principal duty of this senatorial committee for each
party is to determine how many candidates shall be nominated. In
other words, there will probably be no more real nominees for the
legislative positions than there are at present.
An attempt was made to amend the present law so as to
allov/ the voters to decide for themselves whether each party should
nominate one, tv/o or three candidates for representative. The
amendment was not incorporated in the bill and a loud complaint
wasmade against "machine" domination. "^Tiatever may have been the
purpose in delegating to this committee the authority to determine
the number of candidates, the power thus given is really not as
important as it might appear. The cumulative voting system as
has been pointed out requires a definite means of controlling the
number of candidates and this committee is probably as well quali-
fied as any that could be devised to determine this matter. If
left to the people possibly at the first election the voters,
rejoicing in their new found freedom and reacting from the prevail-
ing parti'- control, might decide to increase the number of candidates .
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The confusion and inequalities resultinc would be such that the
electorate would soon decide to do exactly what in all likelihood i
the present committee will do, ntunely, nominate no more candidates
than can prohahly he elected. It may make fine political capital
for a party to pose as a civic reformer and a friend of the people
hy leaving; the whole matter to popular election but so far as re-
sults are concerned they will be essentially the same in either
case.
If the people are allowed to select their candidates by
direct ballot at the primaries it is difficult to see any particular
advantage in having a large number of nominees in the field. If a
candidate receives, or fails to receive, a plurality at the prima-
ries the probabilities are that he would receive the same propor-
tion of votes at the final election and results would only be
changed by trades, deals and other political manipulations. In
other words a direct primary vote should be as accurate an index
of popular sentiment as a regular election and a candidate thus
selected should be as representative of the people as one v/ho
secures a certificate of election as a result of the final vote.
This of course would make the real fight for office at the primary
rather than the final as the nominee would be sure of his place in
most cases. This method of selection would have the advantage of
compelling an aspirant for office to go through but one, instead
of two, more or less expensive and disagreeable campaigns. If the
candidate is required to fight for his place both at the primary anc
at the election it will involve such an expenditure of time and
labor that many desirable men will refuse to become candidates for
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the office of representative which pays hut little in cash and
sometimes less in honor. The position would then he left to pro-
fessional politicians who by soine art are able to make the office
pay for the expense incurred in securing it.
Another advantage in having the real contest at the
primaries is the fact that they are usually held some time prior to
the final elections. (In Illinois under the r ecent act, after
the first year, primaries will he held in April), This removes
the local elections from the turmoil and excitement of the general
campaign in the fall and v/ill h e especially advantageous in pre-
sidential years as the electorate will he more likely to select
a representative because of his personal fitness or his views on
local issues than beca.use of his views on tariff or imperialism.
If the real contest for office is thus transferred to the primaries
and the final election is to ra-tlfy what has already been decided
the only advantages of the cumulative vote, since this pra.ctice
does not prevail at the primaries according to the recent law, is
the fact that it secures representation for a minority party in
each district and prevents the tyranny resulting from overwhelming
majorities.
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SUT'JIARY MP CONCLUSION.
In the preceding discussion it has been shown that the
cumulative vote in practically all cases secures minority represen-
tation ill every senatorial district in the state. Considering only
the tv/o nain parties representation is obtained very nearly propor-
tional to the vote cast by each. Parties other than the Republican
and Democratic seldom have more votes in any district than the
weaker of these tv/o main ones and hence elect but few officials.
There is, however, a much less loss of votes and smaller percentage
of non-representation than prevails under the ordinary majority
system.
The evils of gerrymandering are greatly reduced as is in-
dicated by the fact that the vote required to elect a representative
is about the same for either of the two principal parties while
for senators, elected by the majority system from the same districts,
it requires nearly four times as many Democratic votes to secure one
official as it does Republican to accomplish the same result.
The minority party does occasionally obtain undue repre-
sentation as in some instances a minority has elected tv/o out of
three representatives. Such results, however, occur only in a few
cases, since only in about 2 l/s of the total elections has a
minority elected a majority of legislators from iradividial districts,
These mishaps may be due to bad management, the majority party
failing to nominate the candidates v/hich it might elect; they may b€
caused by the

personal pojmlarity of a candidJite ; by county feuds where tvro or
more are joined in one district; or by the party organii'.ation
fighting valiantly' for a candidate whom it fears may be defeated.
'
In every case v;here a party has had a plurality in the
state it has had a plurality in the lower Houseofthe legislature and
the will of the people, as indicated by party vote, has never been
|
defeated because of an occasional instajice of the minority securing
excessive representation in certain districts.
Any system like the cumulative vote has inherent qualities
which demand strict party discipline. Political leaders of the
state have not been slow to take advantage of this and the method
has been much abused especially in Chicago. The most noticeable
and pernicious evil is the rigorous limitation of the nixmber of
candidates presented "by the tv/o principal parties at each election.
Although party control is required by the cumulative vote it is
doubtful if political bossism in the legislature up to the present
has been v/orse in Illinois than in other states. There is this
difference however. In other states the voters have some opportu-
nities, if they desire to take advantage of them^tc relieve them-
selves of this dictation. In Illinois, with the system of elec-
tion unguarded as it has beenuntil very recent times, the electorate
has small oxjportunity to overthrow the "machine" even if it is so
inclined.
,^
•
The practical diff-iculties of voting under the cumulative
system as used in this state are so slight as to constitute no real
objection
The effect of the cumulative vote method of election on
the personnel of the legislature is difficult to ascertain definite-
1
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ly, since the character of legislators who might have heen elected
to office under some other plan of selection is entirely indeter-
minate. The logical conclusion though is that the cumulative vote
has had little effect on the personnel of the Assemhly. The method
of voting can have no influence on the electorate which determines
who the representatives shall he. Also, in comparison with other
states Illinois' legislators seem to be a fair average thus again
indicating the small effects which electoral methods have on the
character of officials.
Judging from the opinion of representative citizens whose
standing in the community is such that their ideas may "be taken as
a criterion, public sentiment is either indifferent or opposed to
minority representation. The scheme has a few v/arm friends hut many
of those expressing opinions thought it had produced but little
effect in any direction, while others were squarely opposed,
opposition usually being basedon the subversion of the system by
party organization. All agreed that one of the principal objects
of the introduction of the method, the allaying of sectional strife
has been accomplished, but this is now an issue of the past and can
not be advanced as a justification for the present existence of
minority representation.
The strongest recommendation for the cumulative vote is
the fa.ct that at all times it seems representative for a minor
party thus insuing a strong minority in thelov/er House of the
General Assembly. The inherent justice of the first metioned fact
will appeal strongly to civic reformers and is v/orthy of considera-
tion v/hendiscussing the merits of minority representation. V/hile
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the latter miokes impossiiae the tyranny of an overv/helminfr majority
v/hich is too often inclined to override the minority in mere !
wanton display of pov/er. An ever-present minority also serves to !
check the tendency to corruption v/hich almost invariably follows
xvhen one party has for a considerable time a large majority in the
councils of the government. This applies with especial force to
Illinois where withhut few exceptions one party has had control
of the state for many years.
The serious objection to the cumulative vote is the oppor-
tunity it affords for "machine" control and party bossism. If, as
is hoped, the new primary law v/ill break the power of the party
organiiiation and give the people as complete a control of their
legislature as mB,y prevail under the usual majority system- then the
merits of the cumulative vote greatly outweigh the defects and
furnish ample justification for its existence. But if the primary
fails in its express object in this particular, the cumulative vote
method, while iis defects are no worse than are fouiid in the ordinary
majoritj'' system, has so little practical, positive merit to re-
comniend it, that it can only be regarded as a complication which
does not at present justify its existence.



